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time lead to expeditious finding of fact and yet minimize the dangers to the
individuals concerned.
The first such alternative is the traditional one: the use of immunity
statutes.88  These statutes afford the witness protection from prosecution
based on the testimony involved. Since there can be no guilt established
on the basis of the testimony under an immunity statute, the witness cannot
incriminate himself and the privilege ceases. This would of course obviate
the necessity for the instant statutes since the employee called to testify
could not withhold information without being guilty of contempt. If in so
testifying the witness revealed guilt of corruption, etc. he could be dismissed.
Such a dismissal would be on the basis of an absolute admission of guilt,
rather than on mere inferences as is the case with the instant statutes.
The second alternative is to afford public officials special treatment in
the area of self-incrimination by way of constitutional amendment rather
than legislative enactment. This method is not a novel one as evidenced by
the provisions in the constitutions of several states.8 9 Resort to the inclu-
sion of specific limitations of the use of the privilege in the constitution has
the distinct advantage, inherent in the amending process, of curtailing
legislative encroachment upon historic liberties and rights ". . . because
of some accident of immediate overwhelming interest which appeals to
the feelings and distorts the judgment." 90
THE ADMINISTRATION OF DIVORCE:
A PHILADELPHIA STUDY t
"In the whole administration of justice there is nothing that even
remotely can compare in terms of rottenness with divorce proceedings." '
This sweeping criticism, as startling as it may seem in light of the im-
portance to the state of the legal dissolution of families, is in fact typical of
indictments being directed at the entire divorce procedure by lawyers,
judges, and sociologists. Some critics attack particularly the lack of uni-
formity among divorce provisions of the various states,2 while others are
88. See note 10 supra.
89. E.g., N.Y. CONST. Art. I, § 6 (testimony before grand jury) ; PA. CONST.
Art. 3, § 32 (in proceedings against persons charged with bribery or corrupt solicita-
tion. Immunity is granted). t
90. Holmes, J. in Northern Securities Co. v. United States, 193 U.S. 197, 400
(1904), cited in Matter of Doyle, 257 N.Y. 244, 268, 177 N.E. 489, 498 (1931).
t The research for this Note was financed by a grant from the Thomas Skelton
Harrison Foundation, an agency created by the will of Thomas Skelton Harrison to
promote good government in Philadelphia.
1. Smith, Dishonest Divorce, 180 ATL. MONTHLY 43 (Dec. 1947). "Practically
all divorces today are uncontested. . . . These uncontested cases are, in fact,
agreed-to cases. Everybody knows it. Everybody must pretend not to know it."
Ibid.
2. "The only complete solution of the whole problem of marriage and divorce in
the United States is a constitutional amendment authorizing a national marriage and
divorce law." Franklin, Dilemma of Migratory Divorces: A Partial Solution Through
Federal Legislation, 1 OKLA. L. REv. 151, 170 (1948).
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concerned that the gap between legal doctrine and actual practice encourages
deception and lack of respect for the law.3 It has been recognized that
there is a need for empirical investigation in the area 4 to consider the
forces which actually control the legal termination of the marriage rela-
tionship. Because relevant statutes and appellate court decisions do not
tell the whole story of divorce, an investigation of divorce administration
in one city was undertaken.5 This Note is the result: a study of just how
people get divorced in Philadelphia. The sociological problems concerning
the causes of divorce are not dealt with. The substantive law is examined
only insofar as it provides a basis for an appraisal of its administration.
Although the study was confined to Philadelphia, its implications may well
apply to other parts of Pennsylvania and other states where there is a
similarity of procedures and of other operative factors.
THrE IMPORTANCE OF DIVORCE LAW ADMINISTRATION
It is often assumed that variations in the divorce rates among jurisdic-
tions are due to (a) lack of uniformity in the statutory grounds for divorce
and (b) differences in the residence requirements of the various states.
Actually, however, closer analysis reveals that divorce rate differences are
not influenced solely by the laws themselves, but also to a great extent by
the administration of those laws.
(a) The Grounds.-In Pennsylvania the grounds for divorce" pro-
vided in the statute are: impotency, marriage with knowledge of prior
subsisting marriage, adultery, desertion, cruel and barbarous treatment,
indignities, fraud or coercion, conviction of crime, incestuous marriage and
marriage on false rumor of spouse's death.7 Desertion and the various
kinds of cruelty are by far the most frequently pressed grounds for divorce
3. "Social research has further complicated any interpretation we may make of
the relationship between divorce laws and their impact upon the structure of the
family, for it has been conclusively shown that the legal provisions for divorce are
not an index to the real reasons why marriages break up. Divorce provisions are
merely the allowable reasons which have become the legal fictions whereby men and
women secure divorce." Elliott, Divorce Legislation and Family Instability, 272
ANNALS 134, 145 (1950).
4. ". . . There has been a great deal of writing about divorce and relatively
little empirical investigation." KEPHART, A STUDY OF DIVORCE: PHILADzLHrI.
COUNTY, 1937-1950 (unpublished thesis in University of Pennsylvania Library, 1951).
See also BRADWAY, A PROPOSED PROGRAM FOR RESEARCH IN AMERICAN FAIn.LY
LAW (1949).
5. Much of the data in this note was obtained by means of interviews with
practicing attorneys, judges, court employees and others concerned with the adminis-
tration of divorce in Philadelphia. In addition, court dockets and masters' reports
were examined. Masters' hearings, which are usually held in private, were attended
with the permission of two of the seven common pleas courts in Philadelphia. The
verbatim testimony quoted throughout the Note was taken from the official court
stenographers' transcripts.
6. 'Divorce in Pennsylvania is of two types: a mensa et thoro (from bed and
board), which is a judicial separation available only to the wife, and divorce a vinculo
matrimonii, which is a complete dissolution of the marriage. Actions for divorce
a inensa et thoro are relatively rare in Philadelphia, occurring at the rate of only one
or two a year. As hereinafter used divorce shall mean a divorce a vinculo matrimonii.
7. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 23, § 10 (Purdon Supp. 1952).
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both nationally 8 and in Philadelphia9 and they account for the vast
majority of divorces actually granted. Even though the statutes of the
various states differ in respect to many of the grounds stated, practically
all contain desertion and cruelty.10 Therefore, despite the vigorous criti-
cism of the chaotic state of the divorce laws and the ubiquitous call for
uniformity," there appears to be more uniformity in practice than a mere
comparison of statutes would indicate.
(b) Residence Requirements.-Undoubtedly variances in the divorce
rates among states are due in some part to the residence requirements.
The high rate in some states is unquestionably due to many migratory
divorces and these are most common where the required duration of resi-
dence in the state prior to the filing of the divorce is relatively short.
However, the fact that the residence factor should not be given undue
weight may be illustrated by a single example: although both Nevada and
Idaho require six weeks residence prior to filing divorce papers,' 2 and the
grounds in these two states are not substantially different,' 3 many more
divorces are granted in Nevada than in Idaho.'4
Experience both in the United States and abroad has shown that a
rigid divorce law will not necessarily result in a lower divorce rate unless
it can be, and actually is, strictly enforced.1 For example, the statutory
8. 17 BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, VITAL STATSTICS--SPEcAL REPORTS No. 25,
DIVORCE STATISTICS 464 (1943).
9. In a random sample of 1434 divorces granted in the period between 1937 and
1950, divorces granted on the grounds of desertion accounted for 46.9% of the cases,
29.7% of the divorces were granted for indignities and 16.8%'o for both indignities and
cruelty. Thus only 7.1% of the cases were brought on all the other grounds com-
bined. The yearly figures show a downward trend of divorces granted on desertion
grounds and an increase in the number of divorces granted on the indignities ground.
It is interesting to note that only l% of the divorces are granted on the ground of
cruel and barbarous treatment alone. KEPHART, op. cit. supra note 4.
10. Examination of the various state statutes reveals that 46 states grant divorce
for desertion (or abandonment) and 43 for cruelty or indignities. In addition, in most
states where desertion and cruelty are not recognized as grounds for absolute divorce,
they constitute grounds for divorce from bed and board. For cruelty as a ground for
divorce from bed and board, see MD. ANN. CODE GEN. LAws art. 16, § 34 (1951) ;
MICH. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 25.87 (1937) ; VA. CODE tit. 20, § 95 (1950). For cruelty
and desertion as grounds for divorce from bed and board, see N.C. GEN. STAT. c. 50,
§ 7 (1950). New York grants divorce for neither desertion nor cruelty. N.Y.
DomasTIc RELATIONS LAW § 7.
11. See note 2 supra.
12. IDAHO CODE ANN. § 32-701 (1948) ; NEV. Comp. LAws ANN. § 9460 (Supp.
1934).
13. The grounds in Idaho are: adultery, extreme cruelty, wilful desertion, wilful
neglect, habitual intemperance, conviction of felony, and insanity. IDAHO CODE ANN.
§ 32-603 (1948).
Divorce is granted in Nevada for impotency, adultery, desertion, conviction of
crime, habitual drunkenness, extreme cruelty, neglect and insanity. Nav. Comp. LAWS
ANN. § 9460 (Supp. 1934).
14. 31 BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, VITAL STATISTICS-SPECIAL REPORT No. 16,
DIVORCE STATISTICS 225 (1949).
15. For example, a divorce is granted in Sweden at the mere request of either
party after a legal separation of one year. The separation is granted if both the
husband and the wife declare that "because of a deep and lasting disagreement they
cannot continue to live together." Sergerstedt and Weintraub, Marriage and Divorce
in Sweden, 272 ANNALS 185, 189 (1950). This is actually a form of divorce by
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grounds for divorce in Nevada,16 which has become known as an "easy"
divorce state, are not substantially different from those of Pennsylvania
and other states which have much lower divorce rates.' 7 Therefore, in
the absence of any sociological evidence which might indicate that the
populations of certain states are to any marked degree less maritally stable
than the others, and assuming that migratory divorces are most common
where they are easiest to obtain, the great differences in divorce rates
among the states must be attributed to the manner in which the statutes
are administered, rather than to substantive statutory differences.
Recognizing the importance of the administration of the law in its
effect on divorce rates, the administration of the divorce law of Pennsyl-
vania in its largest city remains to be examined.
ADMINISTRATION oF DIVORCE IN PHILADELPHIA
Bringing the Divorce Action.-In Pennsylvania an action for divorce
may be brought only in a county in which either the plaintiff or the de-
fendant resides.' 8 Service may be made on the defendant by the sheriff
in any county in the Commonwealth, by a constable of the county in which
the action is pending, or, if service is made outside the Commonwealth,
by registered mail with a signed receipt.' 9 Where personal service on the
defendant cannot be had because he or she cannot be found, the master
calls a meeting at which the plaintiff is questioned as to the whereabouts
of the defendant.P Information is sought concerning any lodges, clubs,
churches or other organizations to which the defendant belonged and which
might furnish a lead to the location of the defendant. This meeting is
usually perfunctory and generally results in the master's determination
that service can be made only by publication. The Pennsylvania rules
require that the complaint in divorce set forth the names of the parties,
the date and place of the marriage, and the citizenship, the last known
residence and present whereabouts of the defendant to the best of the plain-
tiff's knowledge. The residence and the length of time that the plaintiff
has resided in Pennsylvania must also be included. The rules further
consent-a result which our American statutes would never allow. In addition, im-
mediate divorce for misbehavior of a party is permissible. Yet the divorce rate in
the United States is three times as high as it is in Sweden. Id. at 192. Not to be
overlooked, however, is the possibility that the difference in rates between Sweden
and the United States is due, at least in part, to sociological differences.
16. See note 13 supra.
17. The divorce rate per 1,000 population in Pennsylvania in 1947 was 1.5 and 1.3
in 1948. Nevada had rates of 99.3 and 67.1 for those years. This is of course due to
migratory divorce in great part. 31 BupxAu oF THE CENSUS, op. cit. supra note 14.
18. PA. R. Civ. P. 1122.
19. PA. R. Civ. P. 1124.
20. When the whereabouts of defendant is known, ten days notice of the master's
meeting must be given to the attorneys for both parties. Where there is no appearance.
for the defendant, notice is sent by registered mail and the master has the plaintiff
verify the defendant's signature on the return receipt at the meeting. PA. R. Civ. P.
1133(a)* (3) (b). (Starred Rules in PA. R. Civ. P. are Philadelphia Common Pleas
Court Rules).
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require that the ground or grounds upon which the action is based must be
set forth in substantially the statutory language. In practice this results
in a statement of the cause of action in precisely the language of the statute.
In addition the complaint must contain a prayer for relief and allege that
the action is not collusive.2 1 After the complaint has been filed and the case
comes to issue it is usually put in the hands of a master.
TiE MASTERSHIP SYSTEMI
The bulk of the administration of the Pennsylvania divorce law is
done by masters.2 2 A master is a member of the bar 2 who may be ap-
pointed by the court on its own motion or after a motion of either party,
to hear any case in which there is no petition for a jury trial, or where such
petition is denied.24 If a case is contested, some judges hear it themselves
as a matter of course on the ground that an inexperienced lawyer serving
as master in a contested case may be taken advantage of by one or both of
the attorneys representing the parties; other judges hear contested cases
themselves except when they feel that they can appoint a master who is
especially well qualified. Where an uncontested divorce develops into a
contest the judge may withdraw the case from the master 2 unless he feels
that the master has special competence. An uncontested case in Phila-
delphia County, however, is almost invariably heard by a master. Since
in Philadelphia, as elsewhere in the nation, the vast majority of divorce
actions are uncontested,2 6 the importance of the mastership system is
apparent.
Aside from being a member of the bar, a master need not have any
special experience or training; each judge selects his masters according to
his own standards.2 7 The masters observed in practice varied from lawyers
recently admitted to the bar to older practitioners both with and without
much experience in divorce work. A number of attorneys in semi-retire-
ment are occasionally appointed masters. Although a conscious effort to
21. PA. R. Civ. P. 1126.
22. In some jurisdictions the cases are referred to a "referee"; in others the cases
are tried in court and there is no delegation to a referee or master. See 2 VERNIER,
op. cit. =upra note 9, at 137-8.
23. The Philadelphia rules require him to be a member of the bar. PA. R. CIV. P.
1133 (a)*(2) (a). Although neither the divorce law nor the rules of court of all of the
counties specify that the master be an attorney, the Superior Court has indicated that
this is a requirement in all divorce cases. "Although we seem to have no express
statutory provision to the effect that a master in a divorce proceeding must be a
member of the bar, it is obvious, in view of the duties assigned to him, that one not
learned in the law is not competent to act as a master." Langeland v. Langeland,
108 Pa. Super. 375, 377, 164 Atl. 816, 817 (1933).
24. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 23, § 36 (Purdon Supp. 1952).
25. The court may at any time withdraw a case from a master. PA. R. CIV. P.
1133(a)*(2) (a).
26. KEPHART, op. cit. supra note 4.
27. In some Pennsylvania counties other than Philadelphia, masters are appointed
in alphabetical order or according to seniority, or from a board of standing masters,
annually appointed. 2 FREEDMAN, LAW OF MARRIAGE AND DIvoRcE IN PENNSYLVANIA
1304 (1944).
THE ADMINISTRATION OF DIVORCE
obtain an experienced master is usually made where the divorce is con-
tested, this may not be true in many uncontested cases.
The master's job is to conduct hearings in order to gather the evidence,
and to return the record and a transcript of the testimony to the court,
together with his report and recommendations. 28 The Philadelphia rules
require that the report contain besides preliminary data such as the times
and places of the meetings, a statement as to the service of process, the
findings of fact as to the marriage, the cause of the divorce in brief form,
the residence and jurisdiction, the age and occupation of the parties, and
information as to any children. In addition, the master must summarize
evidence on the merits and include such discussion of it as he deems proper.
He must set forth findings of fact relating to the ground of divorce estab-
lished. Finally, there must be included the legal conclusions reached by
the master and his recommendation as to whether or not the divorce should
be granted.29 Ordinarily a master's report does not involve much legal
research other than the citation of the leading cases which define the par-
ticular ground alleged. Nor do masters discuss what are termed "socio-
logical" aspects of the case, such as the possible effect of the divorce upon
the children. Similarly there is no mention of what many feel to be the
"real reasons" for seeking the divorce, i.e., financial difficulties or family
interference.
In drawing up recommendations in uncontested cases, many masters
feel that if the plaintiff has presented a fairly plausible story, there is no
tenable basis for disbelieving it, because here the testimony is uncontra-
dicted. Therefore, it is not surprising that the vast majority of masters'
recommendations favor granting the divorce. The master's findings of
fact and recommendations are only advisory and are not binding on the
common pleas court; s° it has been repeatedly held that the appointment
of a master does not relieve the court of the duty to examine the testimony
independently and decide upon the merits of the case.81 It is clear, how-
ever, that the disposition of the case will depend in large part on the kind
of record that has been made at the master's hearing. If the report indi-
cates that the plaintiff has a plausible story and that all the elements re-
quired by the statute are present, the master's recommendation that divorce
be granted will ordinarily be approved. The tendency of masters to ap-
28. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 23, § 36 (Purdon Supp. 1952).
29. PA. R. Civ. P. 1133 (a)*(3) (j).
30. "This act does not confer on the master the same power as an auditor or a
master in equity, nor does it give his findings of fact and recommendations the force
and effect of findings of fact by, them." Rinoldo v. Rinoldo, 125 Pa. Super. 323, 326,
189 Ati. 566, 567 (1937). "We have repeatedly held that the report of a master is
advisory only, and that it is our duty to examine the testimony carefully and make our
independent finding. A report of a master who has had the advantage of seeing and
hearing the parties and their witnesses, is, nevertheless to be given fullest considera-
tion. . . ." Vautier v. Vautier, 138 Pa. Super. 366, 367, 11 A.2d 207, 208 (1940).
31. E.g., Middleton v. Middleton, 187 Pa. 612, 615, 41 Atl. 291 (1898) : "It never
was intended that the judicial function should in any material degree be relinquished
by conducting the proceedings before a master in his office, or that weighty judicial
responsibilities should be evaded by shifting it over to a member of the bar."
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prove any claim and judges to approve any record which are prima facie
plausible is evidenced by the very high proportion of actions filed which
actually result in divorce.
3 2
A major purpose of any system for administering divorce laws is to
protect the interests of the state in the proceedings. The doctrine is that
".. . a divorce proceeding is quite different from an ordinary civil
action, as it has its own distinguishing features to be considered.
"While an action to dissolve a marital relationship is nominally
between two parties, the state, because of its concern in maintaining
the marriage relation, unless good cause is shown for its dissolution,
is an interested party. It has been recognized by eminent writers on
the subject, as well as . . . decisions, that it is really a triangular
proceeding, in which the husband, the wife and the state are involved.
While the state does not necessarily oppose, it is the duty of a court
to see that when an attempt is made to sever the relation it shall not
prevail without sufficient and lawful cause shown by the real facts on
which the state permits a divorce to be granted, and to discover and
defeat any attempted collusion and fraud. There is a liberal legal dis-
cretion vested in the courts to accomplish this purpose." 3
This need to protect the concerns of society is especially pressing in uncon-
tested cases, where there is no adversary present to serve as a check on the
plaintiff. The theory behind the mastership system is that the master
through his hearing can, without consuming the time of the courts, serve
both the function of a finder of facts and the quasi-judicial function of an
impartial referee.34 To perform the first of these duties the master must
not merely determine whether the plaintiff and his attorney have prepared
and presented a case which satisfies the statute, but he must use all the
32.
Number of Number Percent
Year Divorces Filed Granted Granted
1938 2012 1713 85.14
1946 6590 5273 80.01
1947 4829 4576 94.76
1948 4255 3866 90.85
1949 3821 3380 88A7
1950 4198 3167 75.44
1951 4040 3266 80.84
1952* 2443 1859 76.09
* From January to July only.
The figures were supplied from unofficial records kept in the office of the
Prothonotary in Philadelphia. Since many of the divorce actions filed are dropped
before any judicial decision is reached, the difference between the number of cases
filed and the number of divorces granted does not represent the number of cases in
which a divorce was denied by the court. Thus, the proportion of cases decided
which result in a grant of divorce is even higher than the percentages indicate.
33. Hall v. Hall, 122 Pa. Super. 242, 246, 186 Atl. 318, 320 (1936).
34. "A master occupies, for the time being, a quasi judicial position, which requires
as strict impartiality on his part as if he were a judge hearing the case." Kolopen v.
Kolopen, 148 Pa. Super. 311, 313, 25 A.2d 569, 570 (1942).
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means at his disposal to ascertain the true situation. The quasi-judicial
status of a master requires that he interpret his duty not as one of helping
to make out a case for the libellant, but as a duty of strict, judge-like
impartiality.
THE MASTER IN ACTION
Prelininaries.-One of the facts which the master is to ascertain is
the correctness of the residences of the parties if given as being within
Philadelphia County.35 There appears to be general compliance with this
requirement. 0 Many masters make it a practice to call personally at the
addresses given; others will call the telephone number listed at the address
given and ask for the party, or utilize a registered letter with a return
receipt requested. In Philadelphia the rules require that the plaintiff
deposit $125 with the Prothonotary when a master is appointed.
3T $100
is for the compensation of the master and $25 for the official court stenog-
rapher, who is required to record the testimony at the hearing.38 Ordinarily
the $100 will cover one meeting and perhaps two; however, if the second
meeting is at all extensive or if further meetings are required the master
will usually request additional compensation, which is generally granted by
the court.
The Hearing.-After ten days' written notice to the attorneys for both
parties,3 9 the master holds a hearing. Some courts make court rooms or
other places in City Hall 40 available for the meetings. It is considered
desirable to hold the proceedings at City Hall not only because of the con-
venience to the court stenographer and the parties, but also because of the
added formality and solemnity of the surroundings. However, masters
may hold the meetings at their own offices if they desire, and this is often
the case. The master, stenographer, plaintiff, plaintiff's attorney, and any
witnesses who have been summoned are usually the only persons present,
in accordance with the confidential nature of divorce actions.
At the outset of the meeting the master swears in the plaintiff. Some
masters make an obvious effort to impress the plaintiff with the importance
of the oath, while with others the act is perfunctory. After the oath is
administered the marriage is established. This will ordinarily entail testi-
mony as to the date and place of marriage and the person who performed
the ceremony, at which point the plaintiff's attorney introduces into evi-
35. PA. R. Civ. P. 1133(a)*(3) (e).
36. See text at note 41 infra.
37. PA. R. Civ. P. 1133(a)* (2) (b). The case will not proceed if the required
sum is not deposited. Note that this fee is in addition to counsel fees and thus may
cast an onerous burden on those of low income who seek divorce.
38. Ibid.
39. PA. R. Civ. P. 1133(a)*(3)(b).
40. In Philadelphia, City Hall is the seat of both the city and the county govern-
ments. The equivalent in most Pennsylvania counties would be the county court
house.
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dence the certificate of marriage which becomes part of the record of the
case. After the marriage is established the residence and judisdictional
facts are ascertained. The Philadelphia Rules of Court require that the
master report the residences of the parties at the time they were married,
each place they have resided since, and the exact number of years and
months each has resided in Pennsylvania.41 Caution, jurisdiction-wise, is
commendable, but sometimes this procedure involves rather extended ex-
amination where the residences have been many and the dates remote.
Nevertheless, masters are generally anxious to prevent any discrepancies
which might be apparent on a review of the record.
Other routine facts which the master must establish are the ages and
occupations of the parties; their race (for statistical purposes) ; whether
either is in the armed forces; 4 whether either has been previously married
(a prior divorce must be proved by means of a final decree) ; the date of
the last act of intercourse between the parties; 3 and who is paying for the
divorce. It must be ascertained whether there are any children and if so,
their names, ages, residences, and with whom they are living.4 4 In practice
the names and ages of any children are put on record and beyond this the
subject of children ordinarily is not dealt with except where the children
are involved in conduct alleged as grounds for the divorce, or where the
plaintiff wishes to show that he has been a dutiful parent. At some point
in the proceedings prior to the narrative of the facts alleged as grounds
for divorce, the master verifies the plaintiff's signature on the complaint.
This is done by displaying the complaint to the plaintiff and asking him
or her whether it is his or her signature that appears thereon. The absence
of collusion must also be proved. This is almost always done by means of
a single question such as the following:
"Q. Has there been any agreement between you and him not to
contest this divorce?
"A. No."
Occasionally the master will ask a further question such as:
"Q. Is the action in divorce being brought in all seriousness and
good faith?
"'A. Yes."
Such questions seem more designed to comply with technical requirements
than to elicit any real information.
41. PA. R. Civ. P. 1133(a)*(3) (j).
42. The Soldiers' and Sailors' Civil Relief Act provides special protection for a
defendant who is in the armed forces. PA. R. Civ. P. *921.
43. ". . . it is well established that when the alleged deserting wife comes to her
husband and has marital intercourse with him, that breaks the continuity of the
desertion." Trussell v. Trussell, 116 Pa. Super. 592, 601, 177 Atl. 215, 219 (1935).
44. PA. R. Civ. P. 1133*(3)(j).
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Many masters have with them at the meeting a check list which con-
tains all the essential questions, i.e., those which ray be omitted only at
the risk of recommittal of the case to the master for the procuring of addi-
tional testimony.45 Recommittal is most undesirable for the master, for
aside from the time, trouble and embarrassment involved, it may cause the
judge to hesitate before giving another master's appointment to that attor-
ney. If no check list is at hand the master may turn to the official court
stenographer for prompting, especially where the master has had little
experience in divorce cases. Because of personal curiosity or because it is
believed an aid in the decision, masters sometimes seek background in-
formation other than that considered essential, such as the parties' religion
or any history of arrests. With so much information collateral to the
main issue to be gleaned, and with the emphasis which masters often place
on details like jurisdictional requirements, it often results that as much
time and effort is devoted to the development of background information
as to the merits of the case. It is obvious that routine matters must con-
sume a substantial portion of the typical meetings which last from 45 to 60
minutes.
The Merits.-When the master is satisfied that he has secured all the
necessary preliminary information he will go on to the substantive part of
the case. This is elicited primarily from the plaintiff. The Philadelphia
Rules of Court require that the master examine each witness in detail upon
all averments of the complaint,4" and that neither party shall be allowed to
examine any witness until the master has finished his examination.47
Actually many masters do not comply fully with the spirit of this rule in
that they merely recite the grounds alleged in the statutory language and
ask for the story in general terms. It seems somewhat unrealistic to expect
effective, searching inquiry from one completely unfamiliar with the case,
as is the master at the outset of the meeting. Frequently the master turns
the plaintiff over to plaintiff's lawyer to develop the facts of the case.
Where the master intends to attempt the development himself he will begin
in this way:
"Q. You allege in your complaint in divorce that on January 10,
1946, at Street, Philadelphia, Pa., your husband willfully and
maliciously and without reasonable cause deserted you, the injured and
innocent spouse, and has persisted in said desertion from the said date,
thence hitherto.
"Will you tell me in your own words the troubles you had in
your married life and the events leading up to this alleged desertion ?"
In addition to the interrogation of the plaintiff there may be testimony
of corroborating witnesses. The master has a duty to call as a witness
45. It has been suggested that a face-sheet type of questionnaire might be used
here to better advantage. This would save time, make for more complete coverage,
and provide statistics more readily. KE:PHART, op. cit. supra note 4.
46. PA. R. Civ. P. 1133(a)*(3) (f) (2).
47. PA. R. Civ. P. 1133 (a)*(3) (f) (3).
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anyone whom he has reason to believe has knowledge of relevant facts,
whether or not requested to do so by either party.48 In practice little effect
is given to this rule, since most cases are disposed of in one hearing and
the master has no knowledge of the case prior to this meeting. Any
corroborating witnesses who are present are generally brought by plaintiff's
attorney in recognition of the customary requirements of the particular
judge who is to review the testimony. Typical testimony of a corroborating
witness is described below.49
Particularly in interrogation of the plaintiff and other witnesses on
the merits of the case is it essential for the master to perform his dual
functions of impartial judge 1o and perceptive examiner . ' In most respects
the ordinary rules of trial procedure apply, with the master empowered to
rule on any objections to the competency or relevancy of testimony.
5 2 Of
course, in the typical uncontested case, since there is no adversary to
object, the responsibility for the exclusion of hearsay and leading questions
is the master's. Yet, although many cases have been recommitted to the
master because of the use of leading questions by the master or one of the
attorneys,53 many masters permit such examination by attorneys. The
masters themselves almost universally use leading questions to some extent;
some use them almost exclusively. As one master put it, "[s] ome of the
plaintiffs don't know how to get their story out, and we've got to help
them." While this is undoubtedly true in many cases there is obvious
danger of abuse by one who is relatively inexperienced in the judicial
function; at any rate the use of leading questions alone is not always the
method of examination most conducive to penetrating discovery of the
facts.
LAW AND PRACTICE
The masters' interrogation on the merits of the case should be designed
to reveal whether or not the substantive requirements as to grounds for
divorce have been met. Yet, comparison of the grounds most commonly
used in Pennsylvania as formulated by statute and appellate interpretation
with typical handling by masters, illustrates the extent to which adminis-
tration differs from legal doctrine.
Desertion.-Ground for divorce is established when it shall be judged
"that the other spouse . . . [s]hall have committed wilful and malicious
48. PA. R. CIv. P. 1133(a)*(3) (f) (2).
49. See text after note 67 infra.
50. See text at note 34 supra.
51. See text at note 33 supra.
52. PA. R. Civ. P. 1133(a)*(3) (f) (4). It has been pointed out that some
departures from normal trial procedure are inherent in the special character of the
divorce proceeding. 2 FREEDMAN, LAW OF MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE IN PENNSYLVANIA
1317 (1944).
53. E.g., Burns v. Burns, 6 Pa. D. & C. 437 (1924); McCracken v. McCracken,
72 Pitts. L.J. 268 (1923). The court refused to consider evidence elicited by leading
questions in Kolopen v. Kolopen, 148 Pa. Super. 311, 25 A.2d 569 (1942).
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desertion, and absence from the habitation of the injured and innocent
spouse, without a reasonable cause, for and during the term and space of
two years." " The willful and malicious character of the desertion is
established by a mere finding that the desertion was intentional, for it has
been held that "if the desertion is intentional it is willful; if willful it is
malicious." 65 It must be further established that the willful and malicious
character of the desertion persisted for the entire two year period.50 There
must be an actual physical absence from the habitation U and it must be
shown that the abandonment of marital cohabitation was without consent 
58
or good cause.59 The mere failure by a husband to support the family
properly does not constitute desertion and is not in itself a ground for
divorce.10 The deserted spouse has no legal duty to seek a reconciliation
or return of the deserting spouse-that is, the failure to attempt to effect
a reconciliation will not be fatal to a divorce action.61  However, if the
deserting spouse makes a bona fide offer to resume cohabitation, the deser-
tion will be held to have terminated; 62 furthermore, if such an offer is not
accepted, the originally deserted spouse will be held to be a deserting
spouse.6 It should be emphasized that a mere showing of a departure is
not sufficient to prove desertion; surrounding circumstances must be shown
which are indicative of the requisite intent.6
The development of a desertion case in practice is illustrated by the
following testimony taken in a typical case. On being asked to tell the
story of the marriage and its difficulties the plaintiff answered:
"Well, we just simply had an argument and he just got up and
walked out, and he didn't return for two days.
"Q. And you didn't see him for two days?
"A. No I did not. He went to his mother's home, and I called
and asked him if he was there, and they said yes. So I asked him if he
was coming back, and he said that he wasn't ready. Naturally, I was
wVorried about whether he was returning home or not. So he returned
two days later and got his clothing.
"Q. When did your troubles with him first begin?
"A. Oh, when he was still in the service. .... "
54. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 23, § 10 (Purdon Supp. 1952).
55. Partleton v. Partleton, 169 Pa. Super. 485, 488, 82 A.2d 684, 685-6 (1951).
56. Ingersoll v. Ingersoll, 49 Pa. 249 (1865).
57. Wacker v. Wacker, 55 Pa. Super. 380 (1913).
58. Bracken v. Bracken, 77 Pa. Super. 219 (1921).
59. Dash v. Dash, 357 Pa. 125, 53 A.2d 89 (1947) (A woman who has good
grounds for believing that her husband is unfaithful to her, may leave his home
without being guilty of desertion).
60. Ingersoll v. Ingersoll, 49 Pa. 249 (1865). The wife's remedy here is a support
order. Gumbert v. Gumbert, 47 Pitts. L.J. (O.S.) 110 (1899).
61. Winner v. Winner, 122 Pa. Super. 382, 186 AtI. 245 (1936).
62. Noden v. Noden, 111 Pa. Super. 513, 170 Atl. 465 (1934); Hort v. Hort,
111 Pa. Super. 119, 169 AtI. 401 (1933).
63. Barnes v. Barnes, 21 Pa. D. & C. 101, 104 (1934).
64. Price v. Price, 83 Pa. Super. 446 (1924).
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The testimony then becomes an account of all the unpleasant experi-
ences that the plaintiff can remember of her married life. There is usually
only perfunctory inquiry into the conduct of the plaintiff during the mar-
riage which might have furnished provocation for the ats of the defendant.
The master will often, however, inquire into the size and character of the
living quarters in which the parties resided. The theory seems to be that
if the living quarters are adequate it might negative justification for the
defendant's leaving the home. Very often if the plaintiff is the wife she
will be examined as to the efforts made by the defendant to support the
family during the marriage. For example, the master may ask:
"Q. Did he make any attempt to secure any work from October,
1945, to January, 1946?
"A. No, he did not. His mother told him he wasn't well enough
to work."
A willful refusal by the allegedly deserting husband to support the
wife is some evidence of the intent to desert. However, it has been held
that non-support in itself does not constitute desertion, nor is a mere
showing of departure from the home sufficient to prove desertion.6 5 In
order to show the departing spouse's intention to desert there is usually
testimony that the defendant took his or her clothing along, and that de-
fendant rejected the plaintiff's request to return. Some typical testimony
follows:
"Q. Did you have a conversation with him at that time?
"A. Yes, I did.
"Q. What was the conversation about?
"A. I asked him to come back, and he said no, he just couldn't
stand me. .. ."
It has been seen that an offer by the defendant to return terminates
the desertion.66 An experienced master may cover this point in the follow-
ing manner:
"Q. Did he on any occasion ever offer you a home?
"A. He did not.
"Q. Did he ever offer to return to the former place of residence?
"A. No, he did not."
The surrounding circumstances are relevant in a desertion case to
show intent to desert, and also to show that the plaintiff is an injured
spouse who has not provided any justification for the defendant's act.
Invariably the defendant is made out to be completely in the wrong.
"Q. When you lived with your husband were you always a
dutiful wife?
"A. Yes, I was.
65. Smith v. Smith, 85 Pa. Super. 74 (1925).
66. See text at note 62 supra.
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"Q. Did you always provide for the means and care of your
husband?
"A. Yes.
"Q. Did you always properly take care of his child and your
child?
"A. Definitely.
"Q. Did you give your husband any reason for justification or
excuse for leaving you?
"A. No.
"Q. Was it a question of money with you?
"A. No, I don't think it was; I'd say no it wasn't.
"Excused."
One can only conjecture as to how the story would sound if told by the
husband in this case.
It is common knowledge among members of the bar in Philadelphia
who handle divorce cases that certain of the common pleas courts prefer
or require corroboration in divorce cases where the ground alleged is
desertion. To be safe, the plaintiff's lawyer brings in a friend or a relative
to testify. Many masters make no attempt to question the witnesses called
by the plaintiff. They merely ascertain the name and address of the
witness and turn the examination over to the plaintiff's lawyer on the
theory that this procedure will save time, since they do not know the pur-
pose of the plaintiff's lawyer in calling the witness. The advantage of this
method was demonstrated in some of the meetings observed, where the
master attempted the initial examination and found that the witness pro-
fessed to have no knowledge of the matters inquired about. Initial exam-
ination by the plaintiff's attorney seems to contravene the rule of court
which requires that: "Neither party shall be allowed to examine any wit-
ness until after the master has finished his examination . , ."7 A typical
corroborating witness may testify as follows:
"Q. Do you know whether they separated?
"A. Yes ...
"Q. Do you know the reason for the separation?
"A. It was over an argument, and he left. ...
"Q. Since January 10, 1946, do you know whether or not George
B. - has stayed any night at your mother's home?
"A. No, he hasn't.
"Q. Will you please tell the master how your sister treated
her husband?
"A. She treated him very good.
"Q. What sort of housekeeper is she?
"A. Very good.
67. PA. R. Crv. P. 1133(a)*(3) (f) (3).
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"Q. Does she take proper care of her child?
"A. Yes, she does.
"Q. At the time they lived together did she take proper care
of her husband?
"A. Yes, she did.
"Q. Did she provide for his wants and comfort?
"A. Yes.
"Q. Do you know of any reason or excuse or justification that
George B. might have had for leaving his wife?
"A. No, I don't.
"Excused."
Cruel and Barbarous Treatment and Indignities.--"... [I] t shall be
lawful for the innocent and injured spouse to obtain a divorce . . . when-
ever it shall be judged, in the manner hereinafter provided, that the other
spouse . . . [s]hall have, by cruel and barbarous treatment, endangered
the life of the injured and innocent spouse." 68 Actual personal violence
or the reasonable apprehension of such violence is required to establish
cruelty.6 9 While a single act, if sufficiently severe, may constitute cruelty,70
it must be such that the life of the innocent spouse is endangered. Some
of the acts which have been held not to support a divorce on the cruelty
ground are humiliating charges,71 refusal of sexual intercourse,72 indiffer-
ence and neglect. 73 However, much of the conduct which does not con-
stitute cruelty is serious enough to meet the statutory standard for the
indignities ground. To insure successful action many lawyers allege both
cruelty and indignities or desertion in their complaint. Then, when the
master's meeting stage of the proceedings is reached, the plaintiff's lawyer
is apt to declare that the cruel and barbarous ground is not being pressed
and he will proceed on the other ground alleged. It is felt that it is easier
to make out a case on the grounds of indignities or desertion.74
For indignities the statute requires that the defendant "[s]hall have
offered such indignities to the person of the injured and innocent spouse,
as to render his or her condition intolerable and life burdensome." 75 The
statute is vague in that it provides no definition of what constitutes an
indignity. Vulgarity, unmerited reproach, habitual contumely, studied
neglect, intentional incivility, manifest disdain, abusive language, malignant
ridicule and every manifestation of settled hate and estrangement are some
of the common judicial formulations of the acts sufficient to constitute
68. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 23, § 10 (Purdon Supp. 1952).
69. See Apelian v. Apelian, 111 Pa. Super. 208, 169 Atl. 454 (1933).
70. May v. May, 62 Pa. 206, 210 (1869).
71. Melvin v. Melvin, 130 Pa. 6, 18 Atl. 920 (1889).
72. McCommons v. McCommons, 85 Pa. Super. 323, 328 (1925).
73. Ingram v. Ingram, 58 Pa. Super. 522 (1914).
74. See note 9 sufra.
75. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 23, § 10 (Purdon Supp. 1952).
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indignities to the person.76 Unlike cruel and barbarous treatment, in-
dignities cannot be established by a single act, no matter how severe. The
evidence must disclose a course of conduct which indicates continued mis-
treatment. Causes which are not recognized as rising to the statutory
standard for indignities are: incompatibility, 7  lack of affection,78 habitual
drunkenness per se79 and poor performance of household duties.80 In
addition, as is the case with other grounds for divorce, if the conduct com-
plained of takes place during a time when the defendant was insanes' or
is caused by ill health,8 2 no divorce may be granted. This is because the
requisite intent is negatived. Since the statute requires that the condition
of the innocent spouse be rendered intolerable and his life burdensome, a
great deal depends on the sensibilities of the individual plaintiff. Mani-
festly, a very sensitive person may find unbearable conduct which another
might consider quite normal. 83
Where the grounds alleged are indignities the master has even less
guidance from the complaint in his examination of the plaintiff than in a
desertion case, where he at least knows that the plaintiff must prove a
departure and an absence of two years. Also, since the definition of in-
dignities is at best rather vague and uncertain, ordinarily the master will
simply have the plaintiff tell the story of the marriage with emphasis on all
the ill treatment and abuse inflicted by the defendant. An illustration from
a case follows:
"Master: You charge the defendant with indignities to the person
commencing in September, 1947, and continuing until June 12, 1951.
Will you start from the beginning and in your own words relate for
the record, the circumstances?
"A. The time we were married, when I moved to Newport, why,
everything went all right for a while, and then she started going out,
came in all late hours under the influence of drink, and any time I
had any few friends up, like Mr. - or Mr. - and his
wife, why, she would tell me how much she hated me and use all kinds
of foul language and it kept continuing ...
"Q. Would you give us an example of the kind of language she
used toward you?
76. Konosa v. Konosa, 165 Pa. Super. 140, 143, 67 A.2d 662, 664 (1949).
77. Ingram v. Ingram, 58 Pa. Super. 522 (1914).
78. Breed v. Breed, 73 Pa. Super. 9 (1919).
79. Mason v. Mason, 131 Pa. 161, 164, 18 Atl. 1021 (1890).
80. Schulze v. Schulze, 33 Pa. Super. 325, 327 (1907).
81. Tait v. Tait, 12 Pa. D. & C. 25 (1929).
82. Crock v. Crock, 96 Pa. Super. 377, 383 (1929), "The conduct of which libellant
complains seems to have resulted largely from her highly nervous condition which,
as he was well aware, was caused by her physical condition. The law does not
recognize conduct resulting from such causes as a ground for divorce."
83. Although ordinary sensibilities are usually said to be the standard, courts do
make allowances for the plaintiff's sensitivity or lack of it. See Shilko v. Shilko, 131
Pa. Super. 395, 397, 200 Atl. 127, 128 (1938).
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"A. You _ - I don't like you and never did. I don't know
why I married you in the first place ...
"Q. Did she keep house for you very well?
"A. No, the house always looked like a pig pen. I had to do
all of the house work myself to keep the place clean. . . . And then
finally she introduced me to this guy and she said he was in love with
her....
"Q. You tried to persuade her to change her mind?
"A. Oh, numerous times, it did no good.
"Q. Did she ever call you names or abuse you in front of your
friends?
"A. Yes, many times.
"Q. And she would curse you at these times?
"A. She would curse me, rave and take off, start arguments, try
to fight with me.
"Q. As far as you know was there any reasonable cause for these
arguments?
"A. As far as I know, no. I tried to do my best.
"Q. Did you do anything to prevent the incidents? . . .
"A. No, I didn't.
"Q. What reason would you assign, if any, for your wife's con-
duct?
"A. As far as I could see, she was just out after the allotment
she was getting from me. When she was first married she said she
didn't love me or anything, all she wanted was what she was getting
out of me, she was getting her support from me.
"Q. Mr. -- do you have any letters or statements from the
defendant to substantiate your claims?
"A. No.
"Q. Is there anything else you would like to state in support of
your case?
"A. No.
"Q. How frequently, how many times a week would you say that
she called you these names that you refer to?
"A. Once or twice a week at least.
"Q. Was that a continuous course during the period commencing
with September, 1947, and going to the date of your separation in
June, 1951 ?
"A. Yes, sir.
"Q. Except the time that you were overseas?
"A. Except the time I was away."
Corroborating witnesses are frequently introduced in indignities cases,
but this depends a great deal on the judgment of the plaintiff's lawyer as
to the attitude of the reviewing court. In the case from which the above
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extract was taken, the plaintiff who was in the Navy, called a shipmate to
testify. It should be noted that the witness will ordinarily testify after
having heard the plaintiff's testimony. The shipmate testified as follows:
"Q. How frequently would you say you went to their home?
"A. Oh, at least once a week, sir.
"Q. What did you observe with regard, first, to the manner in
which the home was being kept? Was it a tidy home?
"A. I wouldn't call it well kept. It looked like a man was taking
care of the place.
"Q. What, if anything, did you observe with regard to the be-
havior of the defendant in regard to the plaintiff.
"A. I say it was generally abusive.
"Q. Would you be a little more specific and tell us what you
heard and what you saw on your visit to this home?
"A. All I know, Mr. - -'s wife used extremely foul lan-
guage at times. It seemed every time we went over and played cards
she would start picking on him.
"Q. What, if anything, did she say to him in your presence?
"A. Well she called him nasty names.
"Q. Such as what?
"A. She called him a - - several times and called him a
, that I know of.
"Q. In your presence?
"A. In the presence of my wife and myself.
"Q. Did you observe the course of conduct, whether or not the
course of conduct by the defendant had any effect on Mr. . - ?
"A. Yes, it hurt the man.
"Q. Did he appear to be nervous?
"A. Nervous and angry, and generally shook up you might say,
irritable....
"Q. Have you noticed any change in the condition of his health
since then?
"A. Well, he is considerably more cheerful, more like his normal
self.
"Lawyer: That is our case, Mr. Master."
As indicated above, neglect of household duties, bad temper, occa-
sional quarrels are not in themselves sufficient to constitute indignities.
It has been held, however, that such evidence may be considered in the
general scrutiny of the defendant's conduct.8 4 While testimony in the form
of general accusations and conclusions has repeatedly been held to have
no evidentiary value,8 5 plaintiffs continue to utilize these generalities.
84. Cutter v. Cutter, 165 Pa. Super. 103, 68 A.2d 192 (1949).
85. E.g., "The acts of the parties are to determine the merits of the controversy.
General accusations of a bad temper, of a nagging disposition and of disagreeable
conduct towards relatives of the libellant, are not sufficient. A complainant who
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Actually, much of the testimony presented to establish a ground for divorce
is largely intended to show that the defendant was generally a disagreeable
person and a poor spouse. This is true in both desertion and indignities
cases. For example, mere claims by the plaintiff of nervousness and
adverse effects on his health are supposedly valueless, 6 yet this type of
evidence is almost universally utilized. It is difficult to determine just
how much effect this kind of evidence has, but interviews with masters
immediately after they had heard the testimony indicate that many masters
come away from the meeting with the general impression that the de-
fendant is a completely unworthy person. This may be very important to
the decision in the case, depending upon the attitude of the particular master
toward the divorce law.
EVALUATION
The story of divorce administration in Philadelphia is essentially the
story of the mastership system. The extent to which masters comply with
and enforce the statute is more significant than appellate court decisions T
in terms of the actual conditions under which the vast majority of divorces
are granted. If the testimony in divorce cases is to be effectively scrutinized
at all, the master's hearing would seem to be the place to do it, since the
master has the opportunity to see and hear the witnesses and observe their
demeanor. In fact, the master has not only the means, but the affirmative
duty to scrutinize the testimony offered. If the state has an interest in
preventing indiscriminate divorces, it is up to the master to protect that
interest in the typical uncontested case where there is no adversary serving
as a check on the plaintiff.
It is apparent that many masters seriously misapprehend their statutory
function. Many lawyers conceive the function of the master to be merely
to decide whether a case has been made out; even judges are sometimes
inclined to consider it sufficient that the interests of both parties have been
seeks to secure a divorce on such a charge . . .must establish a course of conduct
by evidence of specific importance and quality to make out a case. Inferences, loose
declarations, general allegations of ill-temper and abusive conduct fall short of this
obligation." Abbott v. Abbott, 75 Pa. Super. 483, 504 (1921).
86. Rose v. Rose, 124 Pa. Super. 437, 188 Atl. 595 (1936).
87.
Number of Number of
Appeals to Appeals to
Superior Court Supreme Court
From From
Number of Philadelphia Philadelphia
Divorces Granted Divorce iDivorce
Year in Philadelphia * Proceedings ** Proceedings **
1938 1713 9 0
1944 2933 8 0
1948 3866 7 0
* Figures taken from unofficial records in office of Prothonotary in
Philadelphia.
•* Figures compiled from official reports by writer.
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protected, overlooking the state's interest in the matter.8 8 Some lawyers
even feel that the master should aid the plaintiff in the presentation of his
case and the occasional master who diligently probes the plaintiff's allega-
tions is likely to find himself the object of other lawyers' criticism for
treating the plaintiff "like a defendant in a criminal trial."
Many aspects of the mastership procedure as outlined above raise
serious doubts as to the effectiveness of the search for facts conducted by
most masters today. Typically, the substantive facts come chiefly from
the plaintiff, who may be led by his attorney or by the master if he is slow
or ineffective in making a case. If there are corroborating witnesses they
are generally supplied by the plaintiff and will first hear the plaintiff's
story before being called to bolster it. The master's questioning tends to
be perfunctory, with the master eyeing technical requirements or a par-
ticular judge's demands rather than attempting to make the most of his
first hand opportunity to learn all the facts of the case. Rarely does a
master exercise his power to call a witness on his own motion. A mis-
placed emphasis on jurisdictional requirements is often present. The pur-
pose of jurisdictional requirements is to prevent migratory divorce, but
statistics indicate that migratory divorce is a problem in only a small per-
centage of cases.8 9 Perjury and collusion are at least suspected in a
majority of cases,9° yet the kind of searching inquiry which might disclose
perjury or collusion is seldom resorted to. All too often general charges
and accusations play an important part in the testimony.
In addition to representing the state as investigator, the master is
expected to be an impartial judge. That it may sometimes be unrealistic
to expect an absolutely impartial judicial performance is illustrated by an
episode related by one of the official court stenographers. Two master's
meetings were scheduled in a single day. After the first one was over the
plaintiff's lawyer and the master had lunch, came back, changed places at
the table, and the master in the prior case became counsel for a different
plaintiff. The plaintiff's lawyer in the prior case happened to have been
appointed master in the second case. While this may not happen very
often, the master, if he does any amount of divorce work at all, knows that
he is likely to appear before the plaintiff's lawyer who may be appointed
master in a subsequent case.
Another factor in the decisions which may not be apparent in the
review of the record is the attitude of the masters toward the divorce law.
Many feel that the statute is either too stringent or too lax and as a result
88. See text at note 33 supra. In a letter to the UNivnsrrY OF PENNSYLVANIA
LAW REvmW dated August 5, 1952, one Philadelphia judge expressed satisfaction with
the present mastership system, stating, "The rights of the litigants are protected by
the Court's examination of the evidence and the exceptions taken thereto .. " No
mention was made of any interest other than that of the litigants.
89. Although based on admittedly inadequate and outmoded evidence, the sociology
texts usually give 39o as the frequency of migratory divorce. GRovEs, THE CON-
TFmpom~ya AmRIcAN FAmY (1947).
90. CiER, SocIoLoGY, A SYNoPsis OF PIUNcIILIs 402 (1947).
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either unconsciously or consciously tend to conduct and decide the case in
accordance with their own ideas. Much of the difficulty in the administra-
tion of the divorce law seems to stem from the fact that in all cases an
adversary procedure is prescribed, whereas in the overwhelming majority
of cases there is actually no adversary interest present. One authority
described the situation thus:
". .. although in some 90 per cent of cases the defendant stays
carefully away, the plaintiff must, nevertheless, put on an exhibition
of shadow-boxing and give the shadow a knockout to the satisfaction
of the law. Whoever originated the forms and procedures for divorce
litigation little realized that he was setting the stage for a sham battle
against the little man who isn't there. Yet to this day all our forms
and procedures remain those designed for adversary litigation." 91
ALTERNATIVEs
An obvious alternative to the mastership system, and one utilized in
some Pennsylvania counties, is to have the judges themselves hear all
divorce cases, contested and uncontested. The reason generally given for
using masters rather than this procedure is that masters save the courts'
time, since the courts are too busy with other work to hear all divorces.
92
It may be questioned just how much of the judges' time is actually saved
in view of the fact that in the typical case there is just one master's meeting
which lasts from 45 to 60 minutes; although the judge is relieved of these
hearings, he still has the duty to read and evaluate the testimony.
One modification of the present system might be to make the masters
permanently appointed specialists, who would become expert in this type
of litigation. Any system for hearings can be supplemented by a procedure
for the detection of perjury, fraud, and collusion. In England the public
interest is protected by an officer known as the Proctor, who intervenes,
instructs counsel when so directed by the court and investigates the pos-
sible existence of collusion.9 In the United States less than half the
jurisdictions have any provision for an office which resembles the Proctor,
and those statutory provisions which do exist generally cut down the scope
of the office.
One fault with present divorce procedure is the absence of any pro-
vision for an attempt to heal the marital rift. This need has been recog-
nized by recent proposals for reforming divorce procedure. Expressing
the conviction that our present divorce laws "are themselves a continuing
threat to the stability of marriage in contemporary America," the American
91. Alexander, The Follies of Divorce: A Therapeutic Approach to the Problem,
36 A.B.A.J. 105, 107-8 (1950).
92. It has been suggested that an additional reason for the mastership system is
to give lawyers an opportunity to make a fee. Letter by a Philadelphia judge to the
UNIVERSITY or PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW, August 5, 1952.
93. 2 VERNIER, AMERICAN FAMILY LAWS 93 (1932).
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Bar Association Delegation to the National Conference on Family Life
in May, 1948 recommended the establishment of family courts. These
courts would be presided over by judges who specialize in the field, aided
by staffs which include psychiatrists, investigators and social case
workers. In Pennsylvania, a committee of the bar association has been
investigating the desirability of a revision of the divorce procedure. This
committee has found that there is general agreement that conciliation by
trained people is necessary; 95 such conciliation should be attempted as
soon as possible after domestic discord is detected. 6
Whatever changes might be attempted in current divorce legislation
or administration, a vital consideration is that the law as it exists in theory
and as it is practiced should be brought more in line with each other. The
interest of the legal profession requires a genuine concern for the enforce-
ment of the law that prevails in the jurisdiction; an unenforced or unen-
forceable statute breeds disrespect for law in general. Whether recent
criticisms of the divorce law are wholly justified or not, lawyers should be
the first to concern themselves with the problem. Whether practice is to
be made to conform with the law or the law with practice, a reappraisal of
the procedure for divorce is in order.
94. Report of the Delegation of the American Bar Association to the National
Conference on Family Life, 73 ANN. REP. A.B.A. 302 (1948). An attempt to
establish a family court in Philadelphia has been held unconstitutional. Margiotti v.
Sutton, 327 Pa. 337, 193 Atl. 250 (1937).
95. Report of the Special Committee on Marriage and Divorce Laws and Family
Courts, 57 ANN. REP. PA. B.A. 143, 145 (1951).
96. It has been suggested that once the complaint is filed it is too late for
reconciliation, and that therefore it would be best to require a declaration of intent
to file a complaint in divorce; at the filing of such a declaration conciliation service
should be available. Miner, Conciliation Rather Than Reconciliation, 43 ILL. L. Rlv.
464 (1948).
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